
Interoperability Challenges for DRM Systems



Fraunhofer Institut
Sichere Telekooperation

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Virtual Goods 2004


Ilmenau, 29. May 2004

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From Commerce to e-Commerce – From Intermediaries to Intermediaries




Claim:

This story is bound to repeat with DRM protected virtual goods!

- DRM works in a tension field of diverging requirements from
 - Content Owners: protection, enforcement, business models
 - Final Consumers: fair use, personal use, privacy, usability
 - the legal background: privacy, copyright, fair use & 'making available' rights
 - potential intermediaries, e.g. mobile network operators have own interests, resources, and business models
- This interests can only be reconciled by intelligent intermediaries

The Tension Field of DRM

Content owners meet – and miss – final consumers



The Tendency to Frustrate Users

Given the nature of DRM (enforcement) systems, which are based on classical (role based) access control mechanisms, the users' view of DRM systems will be this:




Caveat: Help may come from

- standardisation
- sophisticated rights management systems
- liberal, pre-negotiated licence terms (i-Tunes success factor)
- alternative methods, like watermarking, incentive management

But: none of these comes without an additional effort, resp. an intelligent intermediary


The Easy Way Out – A Dead End for Digital Content

- The Siemens Digital Music Player is a means to give back to virtual goods the traits of physical goods
- It enables very basic content portability, but not much more



- Everything between content owner and DMP can in principle be used as a mere **bit-pipe** – an example of complete disintermediation
- interestingly, the first licensors of the DMP are MNOs (O2 UK &DE) and use it to further their own music portals

Diversification of Rights Expression Languages



- The genealogy of RELs shows two REL families: directed at **content owners**, resp. **content distributors**, in particular for the mobile domain.
- Standardisation bodies try to harmonise, but not much between domains.
- The REL on the distribution side is often significantly *less capable* than on the content owners' side

REL 'Transformation' Tasks – Some Examples

The content owner stipulates arbitrary rights – the DRM system operator is to enforce them

- **Repackaging and Conversion:** E.g. from a secure container to rights/content pair needs
 - unbundling the package (decryption) and
 - reissue rights to the final addressee (cf. the Issue concept of XrML)
- **Location Based Rights:** E.g. for educational (classroom) or entertainment (theatre) scenarios necessitates
 - a **geographical information provider** to obtain the location of the target devices
 - an agreement between DRM system operator and content owner on the **precision of locations and latency of checking**
 - an agreement on how to translate remaining rights, e.g. to **time limited rights**, in order to cater for latency in location checking
- **Pay Per Use Rights:** The target DRM system issues a **single usage right** for every payment received through a **payment service provider**
- **Revocation of Rights:** DRM system periodically (with pre-negotiated latency) checks the validity of licences (**revocation pull**)


Generic REL Interoperability Tasks for an Intermediary

- **Content and Rights Reformatting**
 - Transform content and perform a deterministic transformation of the rights
- **Data Management**
 - Transient or persistent storage of rights, e.g. for sending back reports on rights exertion to the content owner
- **Condition Evaluation**
 - Check validity of licence conditions based on additional information (from SPs)
 - Issue (transformed) rights in to the target (REL) in case of access
- **Dynamical State Evaluation**
 - Continually track states
 - Issue and revoke rights accordingly

Generic Roles for DRM Intermediaries

The federation tasks involve ultimately *rights federation* as a primordial form of *rights negotiation*:

- **Demand federation** allows content owners to view consumers as a homogeneous set, to which bulk rights can be offered
- **Content federation** allows users either to *choose* from the set of possible rights accumulated by the intermediary, or to use rights which have been *pre-negotiated* by the IM with a set of COs
- **Device federation** views groups of user's devices as a homogeneous set over which rights are extended (domain concepts, e.g., envisaged by OMA)



Benefits Delivered by Intermediaries – General

Intermediaries can

- weaken the DRM tension field by shielding content owners from final consumers
- foster fair and personal uses, e.g. by negotiating more liberal licence terms, and thus vouch for consumers (much like collecting societies)
- assure customer's privacy by withholding personalised data from CO
- still provide COs with profiling and tracking data on content usage, e.g. by pseudonymisation and statistical compilation
- provide infrastructure
- provide further value added services
- enable new business models

Benefits Delivered by Intermediaries – The Mobile Domain

Mobile Network Operators are bound to become such intermediaries, because

- they can offer to COs a huge pre-existing customer base
- they want serious return on investment for UMTS licences and therefore
- need to attract (high quality) content owners to 3G networks – thus DRM becomes an enabling factor
- MNOs can reuse their existing infrastructure, in particular
- unique possibilities for location based rights, and
- their connection to payment services, e.g.
- they can provide cost and spending control for end users (an issue of increasing importance to the public)